The US personnel commanding the indigenous force came to SMF with a background in special operations techniques. Our purchases are conducted in three easy steps. Such slow response to a dangerous medical problem obstructed operational effectiveness and once again emphasized the scarcity of air assets. The objective of the STT training program was to upgrade II Corps capability to conduct deep penetration operations ambush, raid, reconnaissance in enemy rear areas.
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M ti khon u t forex uy tn v Di y l bng chi tit v chng trnh Tickmill rebate v mt s thng tin v sn. La chn Sn Dich no Hy la chn nhng sn Forex uy tn. STDAT was activated on 1 May and was charged with providing advice, assistance, and limited financial and material support to STD; with developing, within capabilities, combined plans for special operations and unconventional warfare; and with maintaining direct liaison between STD and MACV agencies concerned with intelligence collection and related operational matters.
Effective 1 December , STDAT continued in its advisory and assistance role, its capabilities greatly reduced in relation to what they were under its previous organization. Planning and coordinating its own draw down imposed reorganization.
Fulfilling its responsibility to place STD in as sound an operational and logistics posture as time would allow. Developing the SMF, and CRF as rapidly as possible into forces operationally ready to perform their assigned missions. The objective of the STT training program was to upgrade II Corps capability to conduct deep penetration operations ambush, raid, reconnaissance in enemy rear areas.
TS Meeting the first of these four general tasks complicated efforts to realize the other three. Careful planning, in particular, was required in order to support the STT right up to the time that Increment 14 draw down necessitated its deactivation, turnover of its equipment, reassignment of its personnel, and turnover of responsibility for conduct of the training to ARVN training cadre.
The invasion caused a shift in emphasis in the prevailing JGS concept from strategic to tactical intelligence collection, as already mentioned. In mid-November they began to make air assets available and to encourage targeting of operations in the Laos and Cambodia base areas. As of this writing ten cross-border operations have been conducted following this renewal of strategic interest.
In some areas, control and support of SMF and CRF and logistical and administrative support of its organic agencies and personnel, the two organizations functioned quite separately. In the case of the STT mission and in the targeting and conduct of operational missions, the history of one generally coincided with that of the other.
The following specific areas of impact were identified and discussed: Group 68 would, as a result, be deactivated. C The limited contract airlift support of STD would terminate. S Although STD would inherit a sizeable logistics facility and inventory from Team , STD would no longer have access, through its assistance team, to a special equipment acquisition system.
It was estimated that in most commodity areas present special equipment stocks would sustain STD in excess of one year at its current level of operations. S Discussion also focused on those measures necessary to reestablish STD in its primary role of strategic intelligence collection.
The genesis of the Golf 5 Security Company is amplified on page In addition to the Montagnard tribesmen, there were a few Nungs soldiers of Chinese extraction and some Vietnamese. Whenever subjects required more detailed explanations a separate interpreter was required to translate the information for each of the three separate tribes. An additional interpreter was sometimes required in order to converse with the few Vietnamese members of SMF who, as a general rule, did not speak or understand any of the Montagnard dialects.
These special mission teams operated as subordinate elements advised by LSAD. The RT members also participated in various specialized training programs which included basic airborne training, High Altitude Low Opening HALO airborne training, long range patrolling, extensive night movement, helicopter rappelling, air mobile operations, and the use of the STABO personnel harness for inserting.
Prior to their assignment to SMF the majority of the SMF indigenous soldiers were well qualified as individuals to conduct small unit combat operations. The US personnel commanding the indigenous force came to SMF with a background in special operations techniques.
SMF was organized into three platoons under a force headquarters element and an administrative section see figure Each US platoon leader had an indigenous counterpart platoon leader. All command decisions, however, both in the rear area and in the field were the responsibility of the US platoon leader. In the cantonment area, by contrast, indigenous leaders were given maximum latitude to influence the actions of their personnel at platoon, squad, and fire team level.
In most instances the US Platoon Leader and Platoon Sergeant issued orders through their counterparts, but by way of defining US command responsibility, it was not unusual, if the situation dictated, for US Platoon Leaders to give specific guidance to individual riflemen. Because there were only two US assigned to each platoon the judgment of indigenous leaders inevitably influenced decisions in the field.
This was the rule rather than the exception since many combat operations employed squads performing as independent elements. The level of expertise and training of the individual indigenous soldier generally assured him to be of sound judgment, in some cases able to issue actions and orders as effective as those that might have been expected from US leadership in similiar situations.
The indigenous TD established a force of personnel; approximately combat soldiers with the remainder being considered support personnel. A US platoon leader and his platoon sergeant commanded each of the three separate platoons even though the indigenous platoon had an internal chain of command, i. A US major O-4 commanded SMF and was backed by a Montagnard counterpart who was the titular indigenous commander, and a highly respected former tribal chieftain.
SMF did not experience the attrition trends among indigenous troops one would expect to find in a similar US unit. The Montagnard soldiers responded to orders with a degree of alacrity rarely found in US soldiers serving even in the most ideal of circumstances.
Such responsive support insured maximum combat readiness for operations requiring, special equipment. Items which required immediate delivery were shipped on a priority basis using STDAT contract aircraft. Indigenous administrative matters to include awards and decorations, leaves and passes, hiring and firing, messing, billeting, limited family assistance, and pay disbursement were a US responsibility.
Cmdr SMF had carte blanche authority to hire and terminate indigenous personnel and thereby exercised an exceptionally potent brand of command leverage. SMF continuously received applications from indigenous personnel, special warfare qualified, seeking job vacancies. Drawing from a large pool of applicants SMF was able to select well qualified, highly trained soldiers, many of whom spoke and understood English.
The soldier working for SMF realized that he could be replaced by someone of equal training and ability at any time. More than 50 per cent of the indigenous families lived within the compound area.
Both soldiers and families enjoyed, by their standards, excellent living facilities. A Montagnard mess hall provided a well-balanced diet of well prepared food. Low sick call rates and the few patients in the dispensary indicated the good health and vitality of the troops. Financial records accounting was done by SMF; however, headquarters STDAT-l58 maintained the personnel records on indigenous employees, thus minimizing the need to maintain detailed administrative records.
The initial emphasis, following the reorganization of GSC, was to train SMF personnel to perform the missions they had been tasked to execute on a contingency basis. One of these missions was to perform crash site inspections. Prior to activation of SMF the Golf- 5 Security Company had been tasked with crash site inspections and remains recovery missions on two separate occasions, following the crash of a China Air Lines contract C flight carrying 32 personnel on board and that of a Cathay Pacific flight carrying 82 personnel.
There were no survivors in either crash. Most of the personnel assigned to the Golf-5 Security Company, as has been previously mentioned, subsequently formed the nucleus of SMF. After it was apparent that the plane had crashed, a force of 16 US and 55 indigenous personnel rappelled from HELOs onto the crash site. Severe weather conditions hampered the initial search efforts, but recovery work began on 9 June and continued through 16 June, during which time all of the bodies were recovered: The Cathay Pacific recovery operation began on 16 June when a force of 3 US and 25 indigenous personnel located and recovered 65 bodies.
Crash site inspections and body recovery missions are difficult to simulate. Even though the task of body recovery and aircraft inspection is a grisly task invaluable lessons were learned from these CSI missions. SMF personnel by virtue of this actual experience became qualified and trained to perform CSI missions. July — 16 Aug In order to insure that the level of combat training and special operations techniques were consistent throughout the Force, SMF began an intensive two week training program as soon as the Pleiku compound was occupied and the personnel organized under the new JTD.
The initial training concept was to launch a program designed to teach fundamental, conventional infantry tactics and the use of individual and crew served weapons at the lowest echelon, i. Such a program required ranges and areas of operations; enough real estate to accommodate a man force.
In addition to the required training area, there were other considerations; lesson plans, qualified instructors, safety personnel, and all of the other support necessary to conduct an effective basic training operation. Some of these requirements constituted serious obstacles to the program. Approximately SMF personnel attended the training each day.
The training cycle did, in fact, provide an excellent background for all subsequent SMF training. Weapons were technically inspected and the necessary repairs were made. After numerous inspections, it was apparent that indigenous soldiers had a professional concern for the care and maintenance of both individual and crew served weapons. The logical progression for the next phase of training was to simulate various aspects of contingent missions and to develop reflexive reactions to specific tactical situations.
From the very beginning of training, air assets were difficult to obtain. C 17 Aug - 23 Aug: During this period SMF trained on those particular subjects and operational techniques which were expected to be most beneficial on actual operations.
A priority requirement existed to teach the indigenous personnel mission essential communication procedures and basic radio maintenance. Much of the training conducted during this period was given on a formal basis in the classroom.
The relatively complicated instruction on long range night operations, land navigation, and immediate action drill exemplified the exasperating experiences SMF periodically encountered in an attempt to insure that all three Montagnard tribes, Chinese, and VN received the subject matter translated and delivered in terms they understood.
The results of practical exercises indicated that the important points were being conveyed with some degree of accuracy. Also during this period considerable emphasis was given to the important subject of night defensive positions NDP. C 23 Aug - 30 Aug: Training up to this time had been conducted in relatively secure areas under simulated combat conditions.
From this point on most of the training was conducted on actual operations where the eneny threat was real and the possibility of contact imminent. After a day of uneventful patrolling, a platoon intercepted and pursued two armed VC on 25 August. Following the VC to the east, the platoon discovered a small, recently vacated base camp at AR Leaving its heavy equipment and rucksacks secured by one squad, the platoon - followed fresh trails leading east.
After passing through an abandoned VC way station, the platoon leader dispatched a six-man recon team to the north whete it encountered and wounded one of the fleeing VC. Three more men were spotted running toward the north and were fired upon with unknown results.
Interrogation disclosed that he was a local force VC running a waystation for small NVA units moving south. The operation terminated without further incident on the morning of the 26th. SMF was at the location of the crash site by where the eight victims were recovered and their remains transferred to the Camp Holloway Graves Registration GR detachment. All personal effects and bodies were sent to Saigon by C The entire operation was accomplished without incident, and remains identification by Saigon GR turned out to be a comparatively easy task because of the thorough recovery of personal effects, which later accompanied the remains to.
Every effort was made to recover as much physical evidence as possible so as to meet the corroborative legal requirements for verification of deceased status. C 31 Aug - 10 Sep Since effective support in the field was a function of timely requests clearly and accurately transmitted to the SMF Tactical Operations Center TOC , communications training continued to be emphasized: This exercise tested the concept of using the MRC as a compact radio system at a launch site, or forward CP.
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